ATSB report details long landing by Virgin Australia B737
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By Andrew Curran.
A Virgin Australia B737-800 landed over half a kilometre beyond the final touchdown zone at Coolangatta/Gold Coast Airport during heavy rain and thunderstorms, with the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) finding that poor runway marking visibility, a high approach and a late flare all contributed to the incident.
The ATSB released its final report on November 19, examining the long landing involving B37-800 registered as VH-YQM (msn 41009) on January 24, 2023. The aircraft was operating a scheduled passenger service from Sydney (SYD) to Coolangatta/Gold Coast (OOL), with the first officer as pilot flying and the captain as pilot monitoring.
The aircraft was conducting an instrument approach to runway 32 as thunderstorms passed through the area. The flight crew were able to see the runway at about 500 feet, but reported heavy rain, dark conditions and poor visibility.
Southeast Queensland can experience some very intense thunderstorms.
The ATSB found that the aircraft was already high on the approach and passed over the runway threshold approximately 37 feet above the flightpath indicated by the precision approach path indicator.
This added about 215 metres to the distance travelled before touchdown. However, the additional height alone was not sufficient to cause the long landing.
The more significant factor was the flare. The first officer initiated the manoeuvre at approximately 44 feet above the runway, around 24 feet higher than the recommended height of 20 feet. Rather than touching down at the end of the flare, the aircraft floated along the runway.
The aircraft travelled a further 635 metre before touching down. Combined with the additional distance resulting from the high approach, it landed about 1,175 metres beyond the displaced threshold and approximately 550 metres beyond the latest nominated touchdown point. Aero South Pacific's Coolangatta/Gold Coast Airport Brief states that runway 32 is 2,492 metres long.
The flight crew did not recognise that the aircraft had passed the latest nominated touchdown point. The ATSB found they were unable to see the touchdown zone markings, which were the only visual aid available to identify the zone.
The investigation concluded that the combination of overcast skies, heavy rain and the time of day created conditions akin to a dark night. Water on the runway made the surface reflective, likely obscuring the painted markings during the landing flare.
The runway markings at Coolangatta/Gold Coast Airport did not contain retroreflective material, nor was there an Australian regulatory requirement for them to do so.
Source: ATSB
Braking action prevented runway overrun
The aircraft's thrust reversers and spoilers deployed shortly after touchdown, and the autobraking system activated. Almost immediately, the captain, who was pilot monitoring, judged that there was insufficient distance to stop using the autobrake setting. He took control of the aircraft and applied maximum manual braking and reverse thrust.
The aircraft slowed sufficiently to exit runway 32 via taxiway C, the last available taxiway. It had slowed to about 13 knots before the thrust reversers were stowed.
The crew had suspected the aircraft had landed long but could not establish the touchdown position because the runway markings were not visible. Following the return flight to Sydney, the captain submitted a report of a potential long landing. The airline subsequently confirmed the landing position through recorded flight data.
The ATSB found that the captain's decision to take manual control and apply maximum braking likely prevented a runway overrun.
Source: Mapbox/APS Aerospace, annotated by the ATSB
Workload, fatigue and missed opportunities to go around
The investigation also identified two opportunities for the flight crew to recognise the potential for a long landing and conduct a go-around.
However, the ATSB found that the combination of weather conditions experienced during the approach and earlier flights had created a prolonged period of high workload, which likely adversely affected the crew's performance.
The captain was also likely experiencing fatigue following several days of poor-quality sleep and demanding flying duties. The first officer did not report fatigue, and the ATSB's review found a low likelihood that the first officer was fatigued.
The captain had reported difficulties adjusting to a regular sleep routine after overnight flights and had experienced disrupted sleep in the days before the incident. Although the ATSB's biomathematical modelling did not indicate fatigue, investigators noted the limitations of such modelling and considered the captain's reported sleep quality and workload.
Top risk factors for landing excursions. Source: Flight Safety Foundation (2009)
Outdated QNH added another safety concern
The ATSB also identified shortcomings in the handling of local atmospheric pressure information at Gold Coast Airport.
The local mean sea level pressure (QNH) changed from 1011 to 1012 hPa at 6.28 pm, about 11 minutes before the aircraft landed. However, the automatic terminal information service (ATIS) was not updated until 6.49 pm, 21 minutes after the change.
Air traffic control did not advise the flight crew of the updated QNH before the landing.
As a result, the aircraft conducted the approach using an outdated pressure setting and was approximately 35 feet higher than indicated. The ATSB found this did not directly contribute to the long landing, but it increased the aircraft's height on the approach.
The investigation identified a mismatch between the alerting threshold of Airservices Australia's Integrated Tower Automatic Suite and the requirement for updating the ATIS. The system alerted controllers to QNH changes of 2 hPa, while the Manual of Air Traffic Services required an ATIS update when the pressure changed by 1 hPa.
This meant controllers had to identify smaller changes themselves. The ATSB warned that an error in the opposite direction could result in an aircraft being lower than indicated, potentially reducing terrain clearance during an RNP AR approach.
Weather around the airport at the time of the long landing incident. Source: Bureau of Meteorology via ATSB.
ATSB calls for improved runway marking visibility
The investigation also highlighted the lack of Australian guidance encouraging airport operators to use reflective materials in runway markings to improve visibility during night operations, particularly when runways are wet.
The International Civil Aviation Organization recommends reflective runway markings at aerodromes where night operations take place. However, Australia had not adopted this recommended practice in its regulations or associated guidance material.
The ATSB found that retroreflective materials would improve the visibility of runway markings in dark and wet conditions.
In response, the ATSB issued a safety advisory notice encouraging Australian aerodrome operators to consider incorporating reflective materials into runway visual aid markings, particularly at airports where runways are likely to become wet during night operations.
The report also identified the incompatibility between Airservices Australia's QNH alerting system and ATIS update requirements as a safety issue.
The ATSB said the incident highlighted the importance of visible runway markings, accurate approach information and the willingness of flight crews to conduct a go-around when there are concerns about a landing.
It also reiterated that runway overruns remain a significant aviation safety threat, with long landings and failures to go around among the primary contributing factors.
You can read the full final report here.
Photo: Virgin Australia
Contact the writer: andrew@aerosouthpacific.com